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Abstract
This paper presents a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in
which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are vertically separated. We
analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally set the charges that operators have
to pay to the infrastructure manager for access to the tracks and how these charges
change with increased competition in the railway market. Our analysis shows that
an increased number of competitors in the freight and/or passenger segment reduces
prices per kilometer and increases total output in train kilometers. The regulatory
agency reacts to more competition with a reduction in access charges in the cor-
responding segment. Consumers benet through lower prices, while the eect on
the operators' prots is ambiguous and depends on the degree of competition. We
further show that social welfare always increases through more competition in the
freight and/or passenger segment. Finally, social welfare is higher under two-part
taris than under one-part taris if raising public funds is costly to society.
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11 Introduction
The introduction of competition in the European railway market lies at the center of
the reforms initiated by the European Commission. Competition was expected to play
several roles: revitalize the sector, increase eciency among the railway rms as well as
have positive spillover eects on the European economy in general. As a general rule
in Europe, one can observe more competition in freight than in the passenger segment.
For instance, the incumbent operator SBB Cargo has lost more than 10% market share
between 2006 and 2009 for transalpine rail freight passing through Switzerland (SBB
2010). In Romania, private freight rms have captured 25% of the total ton-kilometer,
whereas the gure stands at 15% in Poland (Pittman et al. 2007). The situation is not
identical in the passenger segment as only very few countries have witnessed the emer-
gence of competition on the tracks (e.g., United Kingdom). Notwithstanding structural
reasons this can be explained by an earlier mandated opening of the freight segment to
competition.1 Except for the United Kingdom, which is characterized by an oligopoly
of private train operating companies, long-distance passenger services are by-and-large
dominated by the incumbent operators (Beckers et al. 2009).
In addition, access to the rail infrastructure is a crucial component of the European
railway liberalization process (Gibson et al. 2002; Crozet 2004; ECMT 2005; Nash 2005).
For instance, the European Union legislation requires Member States to separate the rail
infrastructure from operations and to calculate access charges for the use of the rail in-
frastructure on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis.2 The First Railway Package
required Member States to separate the management of infrastructure, freight and pas-
senger services into separate divisions with their own prot and loss accounts and balance
sheets.3 While no particular organizational model was required by the EU Directives, one
can identify three alternative models of railway restructuring: complete separation, the
holding company and the separation of key powers (Nash 2008). Although the exact
degree of separation between infrastructure and operations diers across countries, com-
plete separation is the most commonly used restructuring scheme in Europe. It has been
adopted by Member States in northern and western Europe.
Access charges to the rail infrastructure should be set in a way that encourages ecient
use while avoiding discrimination among similar users (Thompson and Perkins 2006). In
practice, one can observe large dierence in access charges between freight and passenger
transport and across European countries. Member states follow three broad models for
1Freight was fully opened to competition as of January 1st, 2007. International passenger services
are open since January 1st, 2010.
2Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 on the
allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure
and safety certication.
3The First Package comprised Directives 2001/12, 2001/13 and 2001/14.
2infrastructure access charges (OECD 2005): (i) social marginal cost pricing, in which the
state covers the dierence between total nancial costs and revenues, (ii) the full nancial
cost minus subsidies in which access charges are set to cover the dierence between state
transfers and the full nancial cost and (iii) mark-ups to social marginal costs, which
serves both eciency goals and budgetary pressures. In addition, the structure of access
charges can be divided into simple and two-part taris. In the former case, prices are set
in relation to the usage of the network (e.g., train-kilometer or gross-ton kilometer). In
the latter case, operators pay a mixture of xed and variable prices (Freebairn 1998).
In short, access charges remain an important issue for the European railway policy
in its attempt to ensure non-discriminatory access to the existing network. At the same
time, they play an important role in determining the competitiveness of new railway
lines (S anchez-Borr as et al. 2010).4 It is therefore not surprising that access charges have
drawn signicant interest at the theoretical level (Dodgson 1994; Bassanini and Poulet
2000; Nash 2001; Quinet 2003; Link 2004; Erhan and Robert 2005). While the existing
literature has focused largely on cost-allocation methods, empirical studies, and analytical
studies of access charges in a vertically integrated market, this paper presents a game-
theoretic model of a liberalized railway market in which train operation and ownership
of infrastructure is fully vertically separated. In particular, we apply non-cooperative
game theory to model the interactions between decision-makers in the railway industry
to determine their optimal behavior. Our model incorporates operators, consumers, the
regulatory agency and the infrastructure manager. We further dierentiate two segments
in the railway market: the passenger segment and the freight segment.Moreover, our
analysis features a two-stage setup: in the rst stage, the regulatory agency sets access
charges to maximize social welfare and in the second stage, the operators simultaneously
maximize their prots.
The objective of this paper is to analyze how the regulatory agency will optimally
set access charges to the infrastructure and how this price-setting behavior changes with
increased competition in the railway market. Moreover, we explicitly assess the eect of
increased competition on the price per kilometer, the outputs and prots of the operators,
consumer surplus, and nally, we assess the welfare implications. The paper is of interest
to operators, infrastructure managers, regulators and policy makers in the railway indus-
try because recommendations can be derived on how to optimally set access charges from
a social welfare perspective.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model
framework of a separated railway market and introduces its main actors. In Section 3, we
solve the maximization problems of the operators and the regulatory agency. In Section
4, we analyze the eects of more competition. Section 5 extends the model to two-part
4The decision to invest in new high-speed lines rests in part on their potential protability.
3taris and discusses dierent objective functions of the regulatory agency. Finally, Section
6 discusses the main ndings and concludes the paper.
2 A Model of a Vertically Separated Railway Market
We present a simple model of a railway market in which train operation and infrastructure
management are fully vertically separated. As noted above, this scenario represents the
situation most often encountered in Europe. In the following subsections, we introduce
the main actors in the railway market, i.e., operators, consumers, the infrastructure
manager, and the regulatory agency.
2.1 Operators
We consider two segments: the freight segment and the passenger segment. In segment
k 2 ff;pg there are nk 2 N+ symmetric operators active.5 Following the literature, we
model the competition in segment k as Cournot competition (e.g., Baumol 1983; Quinet
and Vickerman 2004; Friebel and Gonzalez 2005).
The demand function in segment k is dened as:
Qk = k   pk; (1)
where Qk =
Pnk
i=1 qik 2 R
+
0 is the total output in train kilometers in segment k and
qik 2 R
+
0 is the individual output in train kilometers of operator i 2 f1;:::;nkg in segment
k. The parameter k 2 R+ denotes the market volume, and pk 2 R
+
0 is the price that
consumers have to pay for rail services per kilometer in segment k 2 ff;pg. The inverse
demand function is thus given by pk = k 
Pnk
i=1 qik. Note that we abstract from capacity
problems on the railway network. Moreover, our model posits that mixed trac (i.e., both
passenger and freight) is allowed on the network.
Operators have to pay a charge to the infrastructure manager for access to the in-
frastructure (tracks). We assume that the infrastructure manager charges operators and
that the regulatory agency sets linear access charges (af;ap) 2 R
+
0 per train kilometer
in the freight and passenger segments, respectively.6 Here, our assumption is that the
regulatory agency is entrusted with balancing the transport budget and maximizing the
overall social welfare.7
5If not otherwise stated, the parameter k denotes the segment with k 2 ff;pg. The subscript f stands
for the freight segment, while p denotes the passenger segment.
6In Section 5.1, we extend our framework and analyze two-part taris which are composed of a variable
and xed part.
7The results are qualitatively unchanged for the case that the infrastructure manager prices access
and the charges are then reviewed by the regulatory agency.
4Operator i in segment k realizes prots ik according to the following prot function:
ik = (pk   ak)qik   cik (qik). (2)
The revenues of an operator in segment k are given by the dierence between the price pk
charged to its consumers minus the access charge ak paid to the infrastructure manager,
times the output qik in train kilometers. Furthermore, each operator incurs costs through
the operation of its trains (e.g., maintenance and personnel) given by a convex cost
function cik (qik) with
@cik(qik)





We assume that the infrastructure manager incurs costs through the maintenance of the
railroad network according to the following cost function (Kennedy 1997):
cIM = F + vf










where F 2 R+ denotes the xed network costs, and vk() is a cost function representing the
unit-variable part of the infrastructure costs depending on the total output Qk =
Pnk
i=1 qik
in train kilometers of rail services in segment k 2 fp;fg.8 We assume a convex cost
function vk() with
@vk()




The prot function IM of the infrastructure manager is then given by:






apqjp   cIM; (4)
where T 2 R
+
0 denotes total transfers from the government to the infrastructure manager
to guarantee that she/he breaks even. As mentioned above, the split of activities among
infrastructure managers and operators varies across countries, depending on the type
of organizational model. The dierent degrees of separation aect the responsibilities
in terms of investment, timetabling, maintenance and renewal, train control and safety
(Nash 2008).
2.3 Consumers
Our model assumes that consumers regroup both segments, i.e., individuals in the pas-
senger transport segment and freight rail customers. Consumer surplus CSk in segment
8The costs of the infrastructure manager can be referring to maintenance and operation costs but
they can also encompass renewals or part of the investment needs (CER and EIM 2008).
5k 2 fp;fg is given by the integral of the demand function from the equilibrium price b pk
to the maximum price p0











The nal actor in the model is the regulatory agency. Such regulatory bodies come in
dierent forms and are entrusted with dierent powers throughout Europe. For instance,
in the United Kingdom, the Oce of Railway Regulation (ORR) has been operating
independently for many years. In France, the railway authority (Autorit e de r egulation
des activit es ferroviaires or ARAF) was created at the end of 2009 but has yet to start
operations. In some cases the agencies are explicitly entrusted with the supervision of
access charges (e.g., ORR). In other cases, their remit is dened much more loosely, such
as the supervision of opening to competition.
The regulatory agency sets access charges such that it maximizes social welfare un-
der the constraint that the infrastructure manager realizes non-negative prots. We
further assume that the regulator agency has perfect information about all variables in
the model.9 Governments are concerned with ensuring that the infrastructure manager
breaks even. Because the latter is usually not in a position to do so, the regulatory agency
has to nd a nancial equilibrium by mixing partial cost recovery (charged to the pas-
senger and freight operators) and governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager.
These lump sum transfers T to the infrastructure manager are costly to society because
raising public funds is associated with deadweight losses, which are represented in our
model by the parameter  2 R
+
0 (c.f. Kennedy 1997; Friebel and Gonzalez 2005). The
sources of funds for the transfers to the infrastructure manager often come from dierent
budgets. For instance, in Switzerland, the operation and maintenance costs are part of
one budget, while the construction of new lines is taken care of by a dierent one.
Social welfare is given by the sum of aggregate operator prots and consumer surpluses
in the freight and passenger segments minus governmental transfers to the infrastructure
manager:
W = p + f + CSf + CSp   (1 + )T; (6)
where k =
Pnk
i=1 ik denotes aggregate prots of the operators in segment k 2 fp;fg.
9See Pedersen (1994) for an analysis with private information about costs.
63 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we solve the problem of the regulatory agency and the operators. The
timing of the model features a two-stage structure.
Stage 1: The regulatory agency sets access charges to maximize social welfare under
the constraint that the infrastructure manager breaks even.
Stage 2: Given access charges set by the regulatory agency in Stage 1, the operators
in the passenger and freight segment maximize their prots simultaneously. Finally,
payos are realized.
We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibria in this two-stage game by applying back-
ward induction.
3.1 Maximization Problem of the Operators
First, we consider the Stage 2 maximization problem of the operators in segment k given
that the regulatory agency has set linear access charges (af;ap) in Stage 1. In segment
















For simplicity and to make the model tractable, we assume that the convex operating
costs are given by a quadratic cost function and that the operators in segment k have an
equal cost structure, i.e., cik(qik) =
ck
2 q2
ik 8i 2 f1;::;nkg.10
The rst-order conditions are then computed as:11
@ik
@qik
= (k   ak)  
nk X
j=1;j6=i
qjk   qik(2 + ck) = 0; (7)
yielding the reaction function of operator i as:
Rik(qjk) =





The output by operator i decreases with a higher parameter ck for their own operating
costs and higher access charges ak. Similarly, the output also decreases with a higher
aggregate output
Pnk
j=1;j6=i qjk by the other competitors.
Solving the system of reaction functions (8) leads to Lemma 1.
10Our results do not change qualitatively if we assume that marginal operating costs are constant
(linear cost function). Moreover, we analyze asymmetric operators below, i.e., operators that dier with
respect to their operating costs.
11It can easily be veried that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised.
7Lemma 1 test
Given an access charge of ak 2 R
+
0 set by the regulatory agency in the rst stage, Stage
2 equilibrium prices and outputs of operator i 2 f1;::;nkg in segment k 2 ff;pg yield:
b pk =
nkak + k(1 + ck)
nk + 1 + ck
and b qik =
k   ak
nk + 1 + ck
 b qk: (9)
Proof. It is straightforward to derive b qik by solving the system of reaction functions (8).
Plugging b qik into the demand function (1) yields b pk.
By substituting (9) in the prot function (2), we compute Stage 2 equilibrium prots
of operator i in segment k as:
b ik =
(k   ak)
2 (2 + ck)
2(nk + 1 + ck)
2 : (10)
Due to the symmetry of the operators, each operator in segment k chooses the same
output b qik in train kilometers. To guarantee that each operator has a non-negative
equilibrium output, we assume that k  ak. The lemma further shows that higher
access charges ak in segment k are carried over to the consumers in the form of higher
prices b pk for train services in segment k. The operators increase prices for the consumers
less than the access charge increases, i.e., @b pk=@ak < 1: an increase in the access charge
of one-unit translates into an increase of consumer prices of less than one. However, with
more competition, the increase in prices through a one-unit increase in access charges
augments and, in the limit, would converge to one.
Moreover, each operator lowers its output b qik in train kilometers in response to higher
access charges. Finally, individual prots b ik of the operators and thus also aggregate
prots b k in segment k, decrease with higher access charges (albeit with a decreasing rate).
The reason is that the decrease in costs through a lower output cannot compensate for
lower revenues through a lower markup b pk   ak.




















(nk + 1 + ck)
2
: (11)
We derive that the consumer surplus decreases with higher access charges (albeit with a
decreasing rate) because prices b pk per kilometer increase.
Asymmetric operators:
Now, we assume that operators in segment k dier with respect to their operating
costs, i.e., cik 6= cjk with i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j. That is, we relax the assumption
regarding the symmetric cost structure of the operators and analyze its eect in a duopoly
8setting (nf = np = 2).
The Stage 2 equilibrium prices and outputs of operator i in segment k can be computed
from (8) by setting ck = cik:
b pk =
2ak(1 + cik + cjk) + k (1 + cik)(1 + cjk)
3 + 2(cik + cjk) + cikcjk
and b qik =
(1 + cjk)(k   ak)
3 + 2(cik + cjk) + cikcjk
:
Equilibrium prots of operator i amount to:
b ik =
(2 + cik)(1 + cjk)2(k   ak)2
2(3 + 2(cik + cjk) + cikcjk)
2;
with i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j. It is intuitive that the operator with higher operating
costs has a lower market share in equilibrium. Due to its higher marginal costs, the
high-cost operator will choose a lower output in train kilometers in equilibrium, i.e.,
b qik > b qjk , cjk > cik. It follows that the high-cost operator also realizes lower prots in
equilibrium.
For the subsequent analysis, we turn back to the general case of nk competitors and
symmetric operating costs ck in segment k.
3.2 Maximization Problem of the Regulatory Agency
In Stage 1, the regulatory agency maximizes social welfare W by anticipating the optimal
behavior of the operators in Stage 2. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the unit-
variable costs for the infrastructure manager are given by v() =
Pnk
i=1 vqik. That is, the
infrastructure manager incurs linear costs per train kilometer, which are equal for freight
and passenger trains.12 The maximization problem of the regulatory agency is then given
by (c.f. Laont and Tirole 1994; Armstrong 1996):
max
(af;ap)0
fW = p + f + CSf + CSp   (1 + )Tg subject to
(i) IM = T + (af   v)
nf X
i=1
qif + (ap   v)
np X
j=1
qjp   F  0 and (ii) T  0:
Constraint (i) is the break-even condition for the infrastructure manager, while con-
straint (ii) imposes that governmental transfers have to be non-negative. The solution to
the maximization problem is derived in the following lemma:
12Our results do not change qualitatively if we utilize a strictly convex cost function for the infrastruc-
ture manager.
9Lemma 2 test




(nk + 1 + ck)(v(1 + ) + k)   k(1 + nk(nk   1)
nk(2   nk) + 2(nk + 1 + ck) + ck
: (12)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Lemma 2 shows that the regulatory agency will set access charges according to (12).
Notice that the break-even condition for the infrastructure manager is satised with
equality because increasing governmental transfers above the break-even level is costly
to society. We further derive that access charges a
k increase with higher costs  for
raising public funds: to nance the higher costs for the governmental transfers to the
infrastructure manager, the regulatory agency sets higher access charges. Similarly, access
charges also increase with higher costs ck for the operators and higher costs v for the
infrastructure manager.
Suppose that the passenger and the freight segments have an equal number of competi-
tors and the same market volume, i.e., nf = np and f = p. In this scenario, equilibrium
prices p
k and access charges a
k are higher in the segment that is characterized by higher








) , c > c for ; 2 ff;pg,
 6= .





(k   v)(1 + )





k = k   nkq

k: (13)
In the next section, we analyze the eects of an increased number of competitors in
the freight and/or passenger segment.
4 The Eects of Increased Competition
As noted, the European Commission pushed for the introduction of competition in the
railway sector. Although it initially faced strong resistance from Member States, the
railway markets are evolving towards increasing competition in both the passenger and
freight segments. This transformation is nonetheless still in its initial stage in most Mem-
ber States, and most railway stakeholders, including the government, will have to adjust
to the new landscape and its implications. The separation of infrastructure management
from operations, coupled with the arrival of new entrants, changes the economics of the
sector by splitting the nancial burden of operating a railway network. Our paper makes
10a contribution towards this new allocation.
We start by analyzing the eect of increased competition on the access charges set by
the regulatory agency:
Proposition 1 (Access Charges) test
The regulatory agency reacts to an increased number of competitors nk in segment k 2
ff;pg with a reduction of the access charges a
k in the corresponding sector.
Proof. The proof is straightforward by computing the partial derivatives of a
k with
respect to nk and by noting that nk  1.
To observe the intuition behind the result of Proposition 1, recall that the break-
even condition for the infrastructure manager is satised with equality, that is, T  =
F + (v   a
f)Q






ik. It follows that higher access charges
help to reduce governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager, but higher access
charges in segment k also decrease prots of the operators and the consumer surplus in
this segment. A higher number of competitors in segment k increases the positive eect
of higher access charges on social welfare through lower governmental transfers T , but at
the same time, the negative eect through lower operator prots and consumer surplus
(
k + CS
k) increases as well.13 If access charges are relatively high, then the negative
eect of increased competition on social welfare dominates the positive eect. Thus, to
balance both eects in equilibrium, the regulatory agency must set lower access charges
if the number of competitors increases.14
Furthermore, note that there exists a threshold number nv
k of competitors above which
access charges a
k are below marginal infrastructure costs v: that is, a
k < v , nk > nv
k.15
Having access charges below marginal cost poses a signicant budgetary (and political
problem) because one of the major drawbacks of marginal cost pricing (short-run or long-
run) stems from the fact that railways are experiencing economies of scope, densities of
scale and hence that marginal cost pricing does not fully cover costs (Crozet 2004).
Next, we analyze the eect of a higher number of competitors on prices and outputs
of the operators:
Proposition 2 (Prices and Outputs) test
More competition in segment k reduces the price p
k per kilometer and increases total
output Q
k in train kilometers. The eect on individual output q
ik of operator i is positive
if the number of competitors in segment k is suciently large with nk > n0
k  1 + .
13Formally, the cross derivatives are given by @(@
k=@ak + @CS
k=@ak)=@nk < 0 and
@(@T=@ak)=@nk < 0. Recall that lower transfers have a positive eect on social welfare.
14To abstract from the possibility that access charges are negative, we assume that the number of
competitors is not too large (see the proof of Lemma 2 for more details). For an analysis in which
operators are subsidized, see Else (1985).
15Note that the threshold number is given by nv
k  1=2
 
1 +  + (( + 6 + 4ck)   3)1=2
:
11Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The proposition shows that if a segment is characterized by a relatively low number of
competitors, an additional competitor induces the incumbent operators to decrease their
individual outputs in train kilometers, while the opposite holds true if competition in
the segment is relatively high. The intuition is as follows: from the rst-order conditions
(7),16 we deduce that marginal revenue (k  ak) of an additional competitors in segment
k increases because access charges decrease. Note that access charges decrease with an
increasing rate with a higher number of competitors, i.e., @2a
k=@n2
k < 0. On the other
hand, marginal cost qk(nk+1+ck) increases linearly with a higher number of competitors.
Thus, if competition is high (low) in segment k, then marginal revenue increases more
(less) than marginal cost and operator i reacts with a higher (lower) output in train
kilometers. Even though the eect on individual output by operator i is ambiguous,
total output in segment k will always increase because the higher number of competitors
compensates for a possible decrease in individual output. It follows that due to higher
total outputs, the equilibrium price per kilometer in segment k decreases.
By deriving comparative statics of operator prots with respect to the number of
competitors, we can establish Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Operator Prots) test
(i) Individual prots 
ik = (1 + ck=2)(q
ik)
2 of operator i in segment k initially decrease
with a higher number of competitors until the (global) minimum is reached for nk = n0
k.
By increasing the number of competitors above n0
k, individual prots start to increase.
(ii) Total operator prots 
k in segment k are (locally) maximized for nk = nk and
(locally) minimized for nk = nk with nk < nk.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Regarding part (i) of the proposition, it is easy to show that the dierence between
prices and access charges p
k a
k increases (decreases) with a higher number of competitors
if nk > n0
k (nk < n0
k). Thus, if nk > n0
k, then revenues increase more than costs such
that prots increase, while if nk < n0
k, then revenues decrease more than costs such that
prots decrease.17 If raising public funds is not associated with a deadweight loss, i.e.,
 = 0, then individual prots of the operators will always increase (note that in this case
n0
k = 1). We illustrate the result of part (ii) in Figure 1, which depicts total operator
prots 
k in segment k as a function of nk.
The gure shows that total operator prots in segment k increase with a higher number
of competitors until a (local) maximum is reached for nk competitors. By increasing the
16Due to the symmetry qik = qk 8i 2 f1;::;nkg and thus the rst-order conditions are reduced to
(k   ak) = (nk + 1 + ck).
17Recall that the individual output of operator i in sector k increases if nk > n0
k.
12Figure 1: The Eect of Competition on Total Prots
number of competitors above nk, total operator prots start to decrease until a (local)
minimum is reached for nk. By further increasing the number of competitors above nk,
total operator prots start to increase until the maximum feasible number of competitors
is reached. By noting that the partial derivative of total operator prots 
k = nk
ik with
respect to nk is given by @
k=@nk = 
ik + nk (@
ik=@nk), the intuition is as follows: for
nk < nk individual prots 
ik are relatively high, but they decrease with a higher number
of competitors.18 In this interval, prots of an additional operator compensate for the
lower individual prots of the incumbent operators, such that total prots increase. This
holds true until the local maximum is reached for nk = nk. For nk 2 (nk;nk), the decrease
in 
ik outweighs additional prots of the entrant operator, such that total prots decrease
until the local minimum is attained for nk = nk. For nk > nk, the increase in prots of an
additional operator compensates for the loss in the incumbents prots, and total prots
increase. If individual prots increase, i.e., nk > n0
k, then it is clear that total prots also
increase: thus, it always holds that nk < n0
k.
In a next step, we analyze how a higher number of competitors aects the consumer
surplus and governmental transfers. Proposition 5 summarizes the ndings.
Proposition 4 (Governmental Transfer and Consumer Surplus) test
(i) Governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager initially decrease through a
higher number of competitors in segment k until the (global) minimum is reached for
n = nT
k. Increasing the number of competitors above this level, increases governmental
transfers.
18Remember that individual prots 
ik decrease with nk for nk < n0
k, albeit with a decreasing rate.




2 in segment k always increases through a
higher number of competitors.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Part (i) of the proposition shows that there exists an optimal number of competitors
nT
k, such that governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager are minimized, i.e.,
nT





k. We know that @Q
k=@nk > 0 and @a
k=@nk < 0.
Moreover, access charges a
k are below marginal infrastructure costs v if the number
of competitors is suciently large with nk > nv
k. In this case, governmental transfers
increase through more competition because total output Q
k increases, and with it, the
decit of the infrastructure manager for which the government has to compensate for.
It is therefore clear that access charges must be above marginal infrastructure costs
to be in a situation in which a higher number of competitors can induce a decrease
in governmental transfers. That is, if nk < nv
k and thus a
k > v, then it is possible
that increased competition reduces transfers. In such a scenario, a higher number of
competitors induces a decrease in (v   a
k) but, at the same time, an increase in total
output Q
k. The second (positive) eect dominates the rst (negative) eect, such that
governmental transfers decrease until both eects balance each other out for nk = nT
k.
Part (ii) of the proposition shows that consumers in segment k benet from a higher
number of competitors because the price per kilometer decreases and thus consumers are
better o.
Finally, we determine the welfare eect of a higher number of competitors:
Proposition 5 (Social Welfare) test
Social welfare always increases through increased competition in the passenger segment
and/or freight segment.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The proposition shows that the society benets from increased competition in one
or both segments through higher social welfare. To observe the intuition behind this
result, remember that social welfare is given by the sum of aggregate consumer sur-
pluses and operator prots minus governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager.
From Propositions 3 and 4, we know that consumers always benet from more competi-
tion through lower access charges, while the eect on operator prots and governmental
transfers is ambiguous.
Suppose that nk > nT
k.19 If the number of competitors in segment k is relatively
low with nk < nk, then it is clear that social welfare increases through a higher num-
19Note that nk is always lower than nT
k , while it depends on ck and  whether or not nk 7 nT
k . We
provide the intuition for the case that n0
k > nT
k . The intuition for the case n0
k < nT
k is similar.
14ber of competitors because consumer surplus and total operator prots increase, while
governmental transfers decrease. If competition is moderately high in segment k, i.e.,
nk 2 (nk;nT
k), then the positive eect (following an increase in nk) from higher consumer
surplus and lower governmental transfers compensatesfor the negative eect of lower prof-
its such that social welfare increases. In the case that nk 2 (nT
k;nk), the negative eect
through higher governmental transfers and lower prots is compensated for by the pos-
itive eects of higher consumer surplus.20 If nk > nk, then higher prots and consumer
surplus outweigh higher governmental transfers yielding an increase in welfare.
5 Model Extensions
5.1 Two-Part Taris
In this section, we extend our initial model by analyzing a situation in which the regu-
latory agency sets two-part taris. That is, in addition to the linear access charge ak,
the regulatory agency imposes a lump sum fee Tik for operator i in segment k. Two-part
taris are found in Great Britain, Italy, France, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania and Roma-
nia. As can be expected, one can nd variations in the charging mechanisms, driven by
the level of sophistication desired. For instance, in France, a xed access charge applies
to all trac in the same way. It is supplemented by a train path reservation fee (per
path-kilometer reserved) and a variable charge per train-km). Further charges are levied
on the passenger operations (e.g., stops at stations) or freight operations (e.g., by speed
of train).
The prot function of operator i in segment k is then given by:





ik   Tik: (14)
The lump sum fee Tik goes directly to the infrastructure manager to help him/her to
break even, such that the prot function of the infrastructure manager yields:
IM = T +
nf X
i=1
(Tif + afqif) +
np X
j=1
(Tjp + apqjp)   cIM;
where the costs cIM of the infrastructure manager are given by (3).
The maximization problem of the operators in Stage 2 in segment k, given that the
regulatory agency has set linear access charges ak in Stage 1, is similar to above. Thus,
we obtain the same Stage 2 equilibrium prices and outputs (9), whereas the prots of




20Note that consumer surplus increases with an increasing rate in nk.
15Similar to above, the regulatory agency maximizes social welfare in Stage 1 by an-




ff + p + CSf + CSp   (1 + )Tg subject to
(i) IM = T +
nf X
i=1
fTif + (af   v)qifg +
np X
j=1
fTjp + (ap   v)qjpg   F  0;





ik   Tik  0 and (iii) T;Tik  0.
Again, the break-even condition (i) for the infrastructure manager will be satised
with equality. As opposed to the case with single taris, the infrastructure manager
receives a lump sum fee Tik from operator i in segment k in addition to governmental
transfers T. The constraint (ii) is a break-even condition on prots of operator i in
segment k. The constraints (iii) impose that governmental transfers and lump sum fees
have to be non-negative. Because the regulatory agency has no incentives to leave rents
to the operators, it will set the lump sum fees (Ti;f;Ti;p), such that operator i in segment
k realizes zero prots, i.e., Tik = (pk   ak)qik   1=2ckq2
ik. Substituting this last equality
in constraint (i) and recalling that this constraint will be binding with equality, the
maximization problem can be rewritten as:
max
(af;ap)0
fCSf + CSp   (1 + )[F + Qf (v   pi;f + cfqif) + Qp (v   pip + cpqip)]g: (15)
By solving the system of rst-order conditions derived from the prot-maximization
problem, we can show that the regulatory agency will set access charges and the lump




v(1 + )(nk + 1 + ck)   k(1 +  + n2
k   nk(1 + ))





(2 + ck)(k   v)2(1 + )2
2[nk(2   nk) + (2nk + ck) + ck]
2:
with k 2 ff;pg. In addition to the linear access charges a
k , the regulatory agency
demands a lump sum fee T 
ik from the operators. From the maximization problem (15)
we know that this lump sum fee T 
ik is set such that operators realize zero prots.
We omit the comparative statics because they are similar to the scenario with linear
access charges analyzed above. Comparison of the scenario under linear access charges
with the one under two-part taris leads to Proposition 6.
21The derivation of the optimal access charges is analogous to Lemma 2. A formal proof is available
from the corresponding author upon request.
16Proposition 6 (Two-Part Taris) test
If raising public funds is costly ( > 0), access charges in the scenario with two-part
taris are always lower than in the scenario with single taris, yielding a higher level of
social welfare under two-part taris. If raising public funds is not costly ( = 0) access
charges and social welfare coincide in both scenarios
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
If raising public funds is costly, the regulatory agency can set lower access charges
under two-part taris than under single taris because the operators contribute to sub-
sidize the infrastructure manager with their lump sum fees. Due to the lower access
charges, the infrastructure manager realizes lower revenues, but the lump sum fees paid
by the operators always compensate for the lower access charges. As a result, costly
governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager can be reduced. The consumers
benet through lower prices, but the operators are worse o because all of their rent is
extracted to subsidize the infrastructure manager. It follows that social welfare increases
because higher consumer surplus and lower governmental transfers outweigh the lower
operator prots. Thus, two-part taris enable the regulatory agency to shift the variable
component of the access charge to the xed component, contributing to reduce costly
governmental transfers. From a social point of view, it is preferable that the operators
subsidize the infrastructure manager through their lump sum fees instead of the govern-
ment, if raising public funds is costly. If, however, raising public funds is not costly to
society, it does not matter from a welfare perspective who subsidizes the infrastructure
manager: the operators or the government. In this case, access charges and social welfare
do not dier between both scenarios.
5.2 Dierent Objective Functions of the Regulatory Agency
In this section, we analyze the eect of integrating prots of only certain operators in
the objective function of the regulatory agency. For this purpose, we consider a scenario
in which there is only one monopolistic operator in the passenger segment and duopoly
competition in the freight segment.
We choose this setup because this resembles the situation in many EU countries. In
the freight segment, a substantial level of entry has occurred since 2000. While new
entrants initially failed to capture large marker shares (Steer Davis & Gleave 2005), this
is now changing as freight is undergoing a certain level of concentration through mergers
and acquisitions (Bozicnik 2009). For instance, there is now erce competition on the
North-South corridor through Switzerland between SBB Cargo and DB Schenker. As
noted above, the situation is rather dierent in the long-distance passenger segment,
where incumbent operators tend to dominate the market (Beckers et al. 2009).
17The timing is similar to the general case. Setting nf = 1 and np = 2, we compute
Stage 2 equilibrium prices and outputs with the help of Lemma 1 as:
b pp =
ap + p(cp + 1)
2 + cp





2af + f(cf + 1)
3 + cf
 b pf and b qif =
f   af
3 + cf
 b qf (freight segment)
It is clear that prices are higher and total output is lower in the passenger segment
with only one monopolistic operator than in the case of more than one competitor (c.f.
Lemma 1).
We further assume that the regulatory agency either includes prots p = (pp ap)qp 
1=2cpq2
p of the monopolistic operator (Regime A) or it does not include them (Regime B)
in its objective function GA.




fGA =   p + CSf + CSp   (1 + )Tg subject to (16)
(i) IM = T + (ap   v)qp + 2(af   v)qf   F  0, (ii) i;f;p  0 and (iii) T  0:
where  = 1 characterizes the case where the regulatory agency includes prots (Regime
A), and  = 0 is the case where it does not include prots (Regime B) in its objective
function. Nevertheless, social welfare W includes prots of all operators and is given by
W = p + 1f + 2f + CSf + CSp   (1 + )T.
Comparison of Regimes A and B yields the following results.
Proposition 7 test
(i) Access charges in the passenger segment are higher in Regime B than in Regime
A.
(ii) Governmental transfers are higher in Regime A than in Regime B.
(iii) Social welfare is higher in Regime A than in Regime B.
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
The proposition shows that the regulatory agency sets lower access charges for the
monopolistic operator in the passenger segment if its prots are included in the objective
function of the regulatory agency (see Part (i)). It is not surprising that the regulatory
privileges the monopolistic operator by lowering the access charges for this operator.
Moreover, note that the price-setting behavior of the regulatory agency in the freight
segment is not aected by the introduction of prots in the passenger segment.
Furthermore, lower access charges in the passenger segment induce lower prices per
kilometer in this segment, yielding a higher surplus for consumers of passenger services.
18At the same time, the infrastructure manager prots will decrease as a consequence of
lower access charges. To nance the infrastructure manager's higher decit, the regulatory
agency must raise public funds in Regime A (see Part (ii)). Nevertheless, social welfare
is higher compared to Regime B because higher governmental transfers are compensated
for by a higher consumer surplus in the passenger segment and higher prots of the
monopolistic operator (see Part (iii)).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of a liberalized railway market, in
which train operation and ownership of infrastructure are fully vertically separated. With
our framework, we are able to derive the equilibria for the operators, consumers, the
regulatory agency and the infrastructure manager. In particular, our analysis shows that
an increased number of competitors in the freight and/or passenger segment reduces the
price per kilometer and increases total output in train kilometers. The eect on individual
output per operator is positive if the number of competitors in each segment is suciently
large. Moreover, the prices per kilometer are higher in the segment that is characterized
by higher operating costs of its operators, while the opposite holds true regarding total
output in train kilometers (under the assumption that both segments have equal market
size and the same number of competitors). The operator with higher operating costs
has a lower market share in equilibrium. Due to its higher marginal costs, the high-cost
operator will choose a lower output in train kilometers in equilibrium. It follows that the
high-cost operators realize lower prots in equilibrium.
The regulatory agency reacts to more competition with a reduction in access charges
in the corresponding segment. Consumers benet through lower prices, while the eect on
the operator prots is ambiguous and depends on the degree of competition. Individual
prots of each operator decrease through a higher number of competitors if competition
is not yet very severe. Otherwise, individual prots increase through more competition.
Governmental transfers to the infrastructure manager initially decrease through a higher
number of competitors until a minimum is reached for an intermediate level of com-
petition. Increasing the number of competitors above this level, increases governmental
transfers. We further show that social welfare always increases through more competition
in the freight and/or passenger segment.
Moreover, we analyze a scenario in which the regulatory agency sets two-part taris:
the operators have to pay a lump sum fee in addition to linear access charges per kilome-
ter. We nd that access charges under two-part taris are lower than under single taris,
if raising public funds is costly to society because operators subsidize the infrastructure
manager with their lump sum fees. Consumers benet from lower prices, and governmen-
19tal transfers can be reduced. Two-part taris thus are an eective instrument to extract
rents from the operators without harming the consumers. As a result, the level of so-
cial welfare is higher under two-part taris than under single taris. If, however, raising
public funds is not costly, access charges and social welfare coincide in both scenarios.
Finally, we discuss the eects of integrating prots of only certain operators in the
objective function of the regulatory agency. For this purpose, we consider a scenario
with one monopolistic operator in the passenger segment and duopoly competition in the
freight segment. We choose this setup because this resembles the situation in many EU
countries. By comparing the scenario in which the regulatory agency does not integrate
the prots of the passenger operator into the objective function (Regime A) with the
scenario in which the regulatory agency includes prots of the passenger operator (Regime
B), we derive that access charges for the passenger segment are higher in Regime A than
in Regime B, while governmental transfers are higher in Regime B than in Regime A. Our
analysis further shows that social welfare is always higher in Regime B than in Regime
A.
Our model remains simple and limited. In reality, the pricing mechanisms devised
by the various Member States are much more complex. For instance, in the United
Kingdom, the Oce of Railway Regulation (ORR) has put in place a very sophisticated
pricing system. Despite its limitations, our study can be seen as a rst step to analyze
the eects of more competition in a vertically separated railways market. We encourage
further research in this area. For example, a promising avenue for further research might
be the integration of so-called congestion charges into our model framework and the
analysis of their eects on operator prots, consumer surplus and social welfare.
20A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
The break-even condition for the infrastructure manager will be satised with equality in
equilibrium because increasing governmental transfers above the break-even level is costly




0 = p + f + CSf + CSp   (1 + )(F + (v   af)Qf + (v   ap)Qp)g; (17)
with Qk =
Pnk
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nk(2ak   (k + v)
nk + 1 + ck

= 0;
with k 2 fp;fg. Note that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satised if
the number of competitors is suciently small with
nk < n
0
k;max  1 +  +
p
1 + ck + (4 + 2ck + ):






[(nk + 1 + ck)(v(1 + ) + k)   k(1 + nk(nk   1)]; (18)
with '  nk(2   nk) + 2(nk + 1 + ck) + ck. To guarantee that the access charges are










2 + 4k((1 + ck)[v + (k + v)]   k)
1=2
:
with   (k + v)(1 + ). Thus, we assume that nk < nk;max  minfn0
k;max;n00
k;maxg to
guarantee that the second-order conditions and the non-negative condition are satised.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let '  nk(2 nk)+2(nk +1+ck)+ck. To prove that more competition in segment k
reduces the price p
k per kilometer and increases total output Q
k in train kilometers, we
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2






'2(k   v)(1 + )(ck + n
2











@nk > 0 , nk > n0
k  1+ and
@q
ik
@nk < 0 , nk < n0
k. Thus, the eect on
individual output q
ik of operator i is positive (negative) if the number of competitors in
segment k is suciently large (small) with nk > n0
k (nk < n0
k).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i): To prove the claim, we substitute equilibrium access charges a
k in the operator's
prot function (10) and derive that 
ik = (1 + ck=2)(q
ik)
2, where q
ik are the Stage 1
equilibrium outputs (13) of operator i in segment k. From Proposition 2, we know that
@q
ik
@nk > 0 , nk > n0
k  1 + . Thus,
@
ik




@nk > 0 , nk > n0
k.
We deduce that individual prots 
ik of operator i in segment k initially decrease with a
higher number of competitors, until the minimum is reached for nk = n0
k. By increasing
the number of competitors above n0
k, individual prots start to increase.
Part (ii): To prove the claim, we compute the partial derivative of total prots 
k =
nk












2'3 (k   v)
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and  = 1 + (   4)   3ck(1 + 2)
Note that if  < 0  2 + 3ck +
p
3(1 + ck(5 + 3ck) then  < 0 and thus
@
k
@nk > 0 for
all feasible nk.
22A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Part (i): To prove the claim, we have to show that @T
@nk < 0 , nk < nT
k and @T
@nk > 0 ,
nk > nT
k. Remember that T  = F + (v   a
f)Q























We dene z(nk) := @T
@nk and note that z(nk) is a continuous function in nk. From the
discussion of Proposition 2, we know that a
k  v , nk  nv
k. Thus, z(nv
k) > 0. It follows
that nk < nv
k is a necessary condition for z(nk) = 0. We compute:
z(0) =
(k   v)2(1 + )(1   (1 + ck))
[ck + 2(1 + ck)]





(a) Suppose that  > 0. According to the intermediate value theorem, there exists a
number of competitors nT
k < nv
k, such that z(nT
k) = 0. This proves the claim because T
is a convex function in nk.
(b) Suppose that  < 0. In this case, it holds that z(0) > 0. It follows that there does
not exist a number of competitors nT
k 2 (0;nv
k), such that z(nT
k) = 0. Thus, z(nk) > 0
for all feasible nk. This completes the proof of part (i).
Part (ii): To prove the claim, we substitute equilibrium access charges a
k in consumer




2. We compute the partial derivative of
CS







'3 (k   v)
2(1 + )
2 [nk(2 + nk) + 2(3 + nk) + 3ck(1 + 2)]
with '  nk(2 nk)+2(nk +1+ck)+ck. Thus,
@CS
k
@nk > 0 because ' is always positive
for all nk < minfn0
k;max;n00
k;maxg. This proves the claim that consumer surplus always
increases with a higher number of competitors.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Let '  nk(2 nk)+2(nk +1+ck)+ck. To prove the claim, we substitute equilibrium
access charges a
k in the welfare function (6) and derive the partial derivative of social


















2(ck(1 + 2) + nk + 2) > 0:
23A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
To prove that access charges under two-part taris a
k are lower than access charges a
k






(1 + )(k   v)(2 + ck)(nk + 1 + ck)
'  
with ' = nk(2   nk) + 2(nk + 1 + ck) + ck and  = nk(2   nk) + (2nk + ck) + ck. It
follows that a
k > a
k if  > 0, while a
k = a
k if  = 0.
In the next step, we compare social welfare under single taris with social welfare
under two-part taris. From the maximization problems (17) and (15), we know that
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Suppose that  > 0: because a
k > a







k. Independent of whether or not af Q v, the higher consumer surplus
and operators' lump sum fees under two-part taris compensate for the higher value of
F + (v   a
f )Q
f + (v   a
p )Q
p , such that W  > W  always holds.
Suppose that  = 0: because a
k = a







k. It follows that W  = W .
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
By computing the rst-order conditions of the maximization problem (16) and solving





2v(1 + )(1 + cp=2) + p(2(1 + cp=2)   1)









2(cp(1 + ) + 4 + 3)
(Regime B).
22Remember that operator i in segment k realizes zero prots because Tik = (pk   ak)qik   1=2ckq2
ik.








cf(1 + ) + 3 + 1
(Regimes A and B).
Let ' = (cp(1 + 2) + 4 + 1)(cp(1 + ) + 4 + 3).
ad (i) We compute aA
p   aB
p =   1
'(2 + cp)2(1 + )(p   v) < 0:Thus, access charges
are higher in Regime B than in Regime A.
ad (ii) Note that governmental transfers are given by T s = F +(v ap)b qp+2(v af)b qf
in Regime s 2 fA;Bg. Substituting equilibrium access charges from Regimes A and B in
T s, we compute T A T B = 1
'2(2+cp)(1+)(p v)2 [5 + 8 + cp(5 + cp + (6 + cp))] > 0.
Thus, governmental transfers are higher in Regime A than in Regime B.
ad (iii) Substituting equilibrium access charges from Regimes A and B in the welfare
function, we compute W A W B = 1
2'2(2+cp)2(1+)2(p v)2 > 0. Thus, social welfare
is higher in Regime A than in Regime B.
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